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THE ISSUE 
The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union creates an opportunity for the 
remaining EU27 to accelerate the development of its financial markets and to increase 
its resilience against shocks. Equally, Brexit involves risks for market integrity and 
stability, because the EU including the UK has been crucially dependent on the Bank of 
England and the UK Financial Conduct Authority for oversight of its wholesale markets. 
Without the UK, the EU27 must swiftly upgrade its capacity to ensure market integrity 
and financial stability. Furthermore, losing even partial access to the efficient London 
financial centre could entail a loss of efficiency for the EU27 economy, especially if 
financial developments inside the EU27 remain limited and uneven.
POLICY CHALLENGE 
The EU27 should upgrade its financial surveillance architecture to minimise the 
financial market fragmentation resulting from Brexit and the corresponding increase 
in borrowing costs for firms. While some decline in cross-Channel integration is 
unavoidable, the EU27 should move quickly towards a fully integrated single market for 
financial services, with harmonised rules and consistent supervision and enforcement. 
Policy initiatives need to include governance reform and greater empowerment of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority, further steps towards banking union and 
third-country regimes for the supervision of market infrastructure firms (eg clearing 
houses), similar to those in the United States. With policy integration, there will be less 
need for financial firms to move to one location, reducing the pressure for all facilities 
(infrastructure, offices with trading floors, residential housing) to be in one city.
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1 INTRODUCTION
London is the financial hub of Europe, 
providing corporate and investment 
banking services to the European Union’s 
28 member states and well beyond. In a 
scenario in which the United Kingdom 
leaves the EU single market by the spring 
of 2019, UK-based financial firms would 
lose their passports to do direct business 
with EU27 clients. Brexit would thus lead 
to a partial migration of financial services 
activities from London to the EU27 (EU 
minus UK¹) so that financial firms can 
continue to serve their customers there. 
Some activities might also be relocated to 
other jurisdictions, primarily the United 
States (New York)². The next section dis-
cusses the orders of magnitude involved 
for wholesale banking, a crucial market 
segment. It should be noted that our es-
timates throughout this paper are for the 
purposes of illustration and debate, and 
not intended as forecasts.
The short-term and longer-term risks 
and opportunities involved in this shift 
make it essential for the EU27 to adopt 
clear policy positions on some key issues. 
In the short term, an abrupt departure 
of financial firms from London could 
cause disruption to financial markets and 
to the financing of the EU27 economy. 
Section 3 analyses the structural risk 
that the ensuing fragmentation of 
trading activity might result in increased 
costs and reduced access to capital for 
companies. There is also the related risk 
of a regulatory race to the bottom among 
EU27 countries, leading to misconduct, 
loss of market integrity and possibly 
financial instability.
On the upside, Brexit is also an 
opportunity to build more integrated 
and vibrant capital markets in the EU27 
that would better serve all its member 
economies, improve risk sharing to 
withstand local shocks and make the 
EU27 an attractive place to do global 
financial business. This would speed up 
the rebalancing from a primarily bank-
based to a relatively more market-based 
financial system, which is a central 
objective of the EU’s Capital Markets 
Union (CMU) policy³.
To address these risks and 
opportunities, we review three key 
areas relevant for policy (section 4). 
The first is directly linked to the finding 
that intra-EU27 financial market 
fragmentation is likely to lead to higher 
borrowing costs. To avert this, a single set 
of rules (or single rulebook) is necessary 
but not sufficient. Consistent supervision 
and enforcement are also needed, and 
would be best achieved by a reformed 
European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) playing an enhanced 
role as the single European capital 
markets supervisor. ESMA should operate 
in a hub-and-spoke model with national 
capital market authorities, similarly to 
EU competition policy enforcement and 
euro-area banking supervision.
Second, financial stability requires the 
euro area’s unfinished banking union to 
be further strengthened to generate the 
desired incentives for banks and national 
authorities. We recommend that further 
risk-sharing should go hand-in-hand 
with additional harmonisation initiatives 
and the limitation of banks’ holdings of 
individual countries’ sovereign bonds. 
Third, the future European capital 
markets framework should adequately 
take into account cross-jurisdictional 
interdependencies inside the EU27 – 
especially while not all member states 
are part of the banking union, let alone 
the euro area – and in relation to third 
countries, including the UK, the United 
States and other jurisdictions such as 
Switzerland. The next few years may 
also call for renewed emphasis on the 
EU’s strategic interests in joint global 
initiatives in the area of financial 
regulation, given the likelihood of a less 
multilateral approach from the United 
States.
In parallel, EU27 countries should 
also work on quality of infrastructure, the 
skills base, English-language proficiency 
and tax and labour laws within the limits 
set by the EU framework (eg state aid 
control and fundamental rights) in order 
to foster efficient and vibrant markets. 
The competition between EU27 countries 
to attract financial activity and jobs 
can be broadly aligned with European 
interests if EU-level arrangements 
prevent a financial regulatory race to the 
bottom.
1. The single market also 
includes non-EU countries 
of the European Economic 
Area. In this policy brief we 
use ‘EU27’ as shorthand for 
all single market countries.
2. See Véron (2016a) and 
Schoenmaker (2017) on the 
likelihood of hard Brexit 
and loss of passporting 
rights. See also Martin 
Wolf, ‘Business should 
assume a hard Brexit’, 
Financial Times, 13 January 
2017.
3. See Langfield and Pagano 
(2016) on the case for 
CMU, and Véron and Wolff 
(2015) on a desirable policy 
agenda. The European 
Commission will publish a 
mid-term review of CMU 
in June 2017, to which this 
policy brief is also intended 
as a contribution.
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2 WHOLESALE BANKING ON THE 
MOVE
To assess the extent to which wholesale 
banking could shift to the EU27, we 
estimate the current size in London of 
that market segment, which comprises 
the issuing and trading of debt and equity 
securities, foreign exchange trading and 
derivatives. Table 1 provides an overview 
of total (retail and wholesale) UK banking 
assets, amounting to €10.3 trillion. Our 
ballpark estimate is that about 50 percent 
of total UK banking assets is related to 
wholesale banking in London⁴.
To offer financial market products to 
EU27 clients, banks need a passport under 
the Markets in Financial instruments 
Directive (MiFID)⁵. Based on discussions 
with market participants throughout 
Europe, we estimate that about 35 percent 
of London wholesale banking is related to 
EU27-based clients, varying from about 
one fifth for UK-headquartered banks to 
a third for US-headquartered banks and 
half for EU27-headquartered banks. Thus, 
about €1.8 trillion (or 17 percent) of all UK 
banking assets might be on the move as a 
direct consequence of Brexit.
As for employees, Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (2016) provide detailed 
data for the London operations of the 
top five US investment banks, which 
together account for about a third of 
London wholesale banking. Panel A of 
Table 2 suggests that 35 percent of the 
corresponding sales might move to the 
EU27. The number of positions that 
will move with this volume of business 
depends on business considerations 
of the investment banks and on the 
‘substance requirement’ of the EU 
supervisors. This requirement enables 
supervisors to demand sufficient 
‘substance’ in the form of management, 
staff and internal control systems as part 
of the licencing procedure. At a minimum, 
it is expected that the new EU27-based 
entities will need to have autonomous 
boards, full senior management teams, 
senior account managers and traders, 
even though much of the back-office 
might stay in London or elsewhere in 
the world⁶. We thus estimate that 10 to 
15 percent of positions might move, or 
about 3,300 positions at the five top US 
investment banks (Table 2, Panel B). 
As US investment banks count for one 
third of London wholesale activity that 
might move, our estimate for the entire 
wholesale banking segment would 
amount to 10,000 banking positions 
moving from London to the EU27. In a 
separate paper (Batsaikhan et al, 2017), 
we estimate that a further 18,000 to 20,000 
4. See Batsaikhan, Kalcik and 
Schoenmaker (2017) for a 
more detailed assessment.
5. Directive 2004/39/EC, 
http://ec.europa.eu/
finance/securities/isd/in-
dex_en.htm.
6. See Principle 5 of the Basel 
Core Principles of Effec-
tive Supervision (Basel 
Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2012), which 
states that “The licensing 
authority determines that 
the proposed legal, man-
agerial, operational and 
ownership structures of the 
bank and its wider group 
will not hinder effective 
supervision on both a solo 
and a consolidated basis.”
Table 1: Wholesale banking in London (end-2014)
Bank types
Total assets 
Wholesale banking in 
London
Wholesale banking for EU27 clients
Assets
(€ billions)
% of total 
UK banks
Assets 
(€ billions)
% of total 
assets
Assets
(€ billions)
% of 
wholesale
% of total 
assets
Major UK 
international banks
4,583 45% 1,375 30% 275 20% 6%
Major UK domestic 
banks
1,489 15% 0 0% 0 - 0%
Other UK banks 321 3% 0 0% 0 - 0%
Rest of the world 
investment banks
2,221 22% 2,221 100% 777 35% 35%
Rest of the world 
other banks
591 6% 591 100% 207 35% 35%
Branches of EU 
banks
1,018 10% 1,018 100% 509 50% 50%
Total UK banking 
system
10,223 100% 5,205 51% 1,768 34% 17%
Source: Bruegel. Note: Total assets based on Burrows, Cumming and Low (2015) and for branches from EU banks on ECB (2015). Bruegel estimates for wholesale banking (issuing and 
trading securities, foreign exchange, derivatives) in London and for wholesale banking for EU27 clients. The final columns (wholesale banking for EU27 clients) are estimates for the 
business moving to EU27 after Brexit.
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7. We do not discuss here the 
extent to which the relocat-
ed positions might be filled 
by the same employees 
who held them in London.
8. Our calculations are based 
on €6.1 trillion of house-
hold loans and €5.0 trillion 
of corporate loans from 
EU27 monetary finan-
cial institutions and €1.2 
trillion of corporate bonds 
(ECB Monetary Statistics, 
December 2016).
positions related to professional services 
(eg consultancy, legal and accounting) 
might be on the move⁷.
3 INTEGRATION VERSUS 
FRAGMENTATION IN THE EU27
Where would the London business move 
to in the EU27: an integrated wholesale 
market or one fragmented along national 
lines? We make a first tentative analysis 
of the benefits and drawbacks of inte-
gration. Fragmentation would lead to an 
increase in borrowing costs in the EU27, 
compared to an integrated market for the 
EU27. By using different trading venues 
and central counterparties, banks would 
forego synergies from cross-margining 
across products, and would need to 
expand their staff and systems to comply 
with diverging local requirements. Even 
assuming that banks can continue to 
participate in the London market for their 
own risk management purposes (eg de-
rivatives or off-setting forex deals), they 
would need to relocate the wholesale 
trading of securities, foreign exchange 
and derivatives for EU27 clients to the 
national markets of the EU27 because of 
the MiFID passport. This would result in 
a higher cost of capital for households 
(mortgages and consumer credit) and 
corporates (bank loans and corporate 
bonds). We conservatively estimate the 
higher cost of capital to be in the range 
of 5 to 10 basis points. This amounts to 
an extra annual cost of €6 billion to €12 
billion for households and corporates, 
or 0.05 to 0.1 percent of EU27 GDP⁸. This 
extra cost of the fragmented EU27 com-
pared to the integrated EU27 would be 
additional to the (possibly greater) cost 
resulting from the partial loss of access 
to the efficient London financial mar-
ket, which we take as given and do not 
attempt to estimate here. 
As for the drawbacks of integration, 
concentration of financial activities 
can have a negative impact on other 
industries. The financial sector might 
Table 2: European operations of top five US investment banks, revenues and 
employees
Panel A
Revenue by country, end-2014
(in € millions and %) 
Potentially relocated revenue
(in € millions and %)
United Kingdom 22,744 92% 7,960 35%
Germany 513 2%    
France 361 1%    
Italy 193 1%    
Ireland 201 1%    
Luxembourg 276 1%    
Other EU 438 2%    
Total 24,726 100%    
Panel B
Number of current employees by 
country 
Potentially relocated positions
United Kingdom 26,629 89% 3,329 10-15%
Germany 794 3%    
France 293 1%    
Italy 326 1%    
Ireland 1,011 3%    
Luxembourg 491 2%    
Other EU 365 1%    
Total 29,909 100%    
Source: Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2016). Note: The data refer to European operations of the five US investment banks, namely Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and Morgan Stanley. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2016) provide a breakdown for each 
bank. Bruegel estimates for potential moves.
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9. See, for example, Degryse, 
De Jong and Van Kervel 
(2015).
10. Of course, other financial 
centres will also play a key 
part in the new system, 
including presumably 
Brussels, Copenhagen, 
Luxembourg, Madrid, 
Milan, Stockholm, Vienna, 
Warsaw and probably 
others as well. What we 
present here should be 
viewed as a simplistic 
projection for illustrative 
purposes, not a forecast.
11. Some investment bank-
ing operations may be 
currently outside of the 
ECB’s scope of supervisory 
authority, but we expect 
financial firms to anticipate 
the likely future enlarge-
ment of the ECB’s mandate 
to the oversight of such 
market segments.
attract too many graduates from a 
country’s talent pool and overvalue 
the real exchange rate, and it can also 
become too big for the country (as 
London has for the UK). But trading 
parties do not need to be all in the same 
physical location to enjoy the benefits 
of integration⁹. As long as consistent 
rules and enforcement guarantee equal 
conditions, traders can operate from 
different places. Moreover, trading 
venues can be linked electronically to 
facilitate best execution. But common 
rules across member states are not 
enough. The framework must ensure that 
administrative decisions (which we refer 
to here as ‘enforcement’, but which also 
include various regimes of authorisation, 
registration and supervision) are also 
consistent (Véron, 2015). 
To illustrate these points, we present 
two scenarios for the EU27 financial 
system, while acknowledging that 
these are inevitably arbitrary. In both 
scenarios the UK’s share of the total 
European wholesale market drops from 
90 to 60 percent because of Brexit. The 
starting point is that financial firms with 
a MiFID passport can serve EU27 clients 
from anywhere in the EU27, just as they 
currently do from London. In Batsaikhan, 
et al (2017), we compare London and 
four major cities that together might 
ultimately host most of the new EU27 
wholesale market: Frankfurt, Paris, 
Dublin and Amsterdam¹⁰. Scenario A 
assumes fragmented markets in the 
EU27, with financial rules subject 
to national variations and national 
supervision. Paradoxically, fragmentation 
of markets leads to a concentration 
of the financial industry. Banks have 
an incentive to move to the same 
place in order to minimise the cost 
of fragmentation. Frankfurt already 
hosts the biggest European operations 
of the US investment banks outside 
London (see Table 2) and is home to the 
European Central Bank (ECB), which 
is now also the euro area’s banking 
supervisor¹¹. For this and other reasons, 
we assume that Frankfurt is positioned to 
become the most prominent centre with 
45 percent of the EU27 wholesale market. 
Next, Paris, which is home to the markets 
supervisor ESMA and several large banks, 
may cover 20 percent. The runners-up, 
Dublin and Amsterdam, might cover 
15 and 10 percent respectively, and an 
aggregate 10 percent in all other centres 
(see Table 3). 
By contrast, under scenario B, which 
Table 3: Scenarios for migration of wholesale markets
Current situation  
(% of market)
Scenario A: Fragmentation 
 (% market ) 
Scenario B: Integration 
(% market ) 
Total European 
market
Total European 
market
EU27 market
Total European 
market
EU27 market
United Kingdom 90% 60%  60%  
Germany 2% 18% 45% 14% 35%
France 1% 8% 20% 8% 20%
Ireland 2% 6% 15% 7% 18%
Netherlands 1% 4% 10% 5% 12%
Luxembourg 1% 1% 3% 2% 4%
Italy 1% 1% 3% 2% 4%
Spain 1% 1% 3% 1% 4%
Other EU 1% 1% 1% 1% 3%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
 Source: Bruegel. Note: The current market shares are based on Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2016). In both scenarios 35 percent of the UK market moves to the EU27, so that 60 percent 
of the current European wholesale market stays in London. Scenario A assumes fragmented markets in the EU27, leading to concentration. Scenario B assumes an integrated market for 
the EU27, allowing a geographically spread industry.
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assumes integration, there is less need 
for all activities to move to one location, 
which reduces the pressure to (and price 
of) having all facilities (infrastructure, 
offices with trading floors, residential 
housing) in one city. In this scenario with 
a more geographically spread industry, 
35 percent of EU27 wholesale finance 
might be in Frankfurt, 12-20 percent each 
in Amsterdam, Dublin and Paris, and an 
aggregate 15 percent in all other centres. 
Regardless of whether the EU27 
financial system post-Brexit is hosted 
mainly in one location or dispersed 
between several locations, these 
locations are likely to be inside rather 
than outside the euro area, for two 
reasons. First, currently the largest 
financial centres within the EU, besides 
London, are located in the euro area. 
Second, the ECB, as supplier of liquidity 
and banking supervisor, is clearly 
unrivalled in the EU27¹².
The fact that several countries are 
currently vying to attract business from 
London suggests that they hope to reap 
benefits from having larger financial 
sectors, not least in the form of additional 
tax revenue. At the same time countries 
with larger financial sectors face higher 
potential costs associated with potential 
public expenditure in case of financial 
turmoil. These potential costs would be 
shared by all euro-area countries in a full 
banking union, but not in an incomplete 
banking union, as is currently the case. 
Overall, it will be a challenge to keep a 
sense of the balance between benefits 
and potential costs across euro-area 
countries.
4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY
EU27 leaders need to set their objectives 
clearly for the reshaping of the financial 
system that is being triggered by Brexit. 
Different countries and cities will natu-
rally compete to attract business moving 
out from London, leading to an unavoid-
able mix of competition and cooperation. 
We strongly recommend that leaders 
unambiguously state that this competi-
tion should not be on the basis of finan-
cial regulation and supervision¹³. Such 
a statement should be rapidly backed 
up by concrete decisions – even though 
their implementation will inevitably take 
time. A topical example is the substance 
requirement: EU-level arrangements 
should prevent national authorities from 
imposing only superficial requirements 
in order to attract business. 
A GREATER ROLE FOR ESMA
As we have noted, consistent oversight of 
wholesale markets and enforcement of 
relevant regulation is critical to achieve 
cross-border integration. This requires in-
tegration of the institutional architecture, 
for which the tried-and-tested model in 
the EU is a hub-and-spoke design, long 
used for competition policy and, more 
recently, for banking supervision. The 
straightforward way of implementing 
this, without the need for changes to the 
EU treaties, is through the reinforcement 
of ESMA, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority that was created in 
2011 and that already has a direct EU-
wide supervisory role, though only for 
limited market segments¹⁴. It is notable 
that the call for a single EU capital mar-
kets supervisor has come not only from 
EU authorities, most prominently in the 
Five Presidents’ Report of June 2015, but 
also from some countries (eg German 
Council of Economic Advisers, 2016).
A broadening of the scope of 
ESMA’s authority requires reform of its 
governance and funding, which currently 
limit its independence and capacity. 
Such reform should not disrupt ESMA’s 
operations in the meantime, but should 
align it with better designed institutions, 
such as the ECB’s Supervisory Board 
and the Single Resolution Board. ESMA 
should be managed by an executive 
board of five or six full-time members 
vetted by the European Parliament, in 
place of the current supervisory board 
of national representatives (in which the 
chair cannot even cast a vote). This would 
help to overcome distortions arising from 
influential national interests and would 
prevent regulatory capture. In line with 
international practice, the reinforced 
ESMA’s funding should rely on a small 
levy on capital markets activity under 
scrutiny of the European Parliament, 
instead of the current political bargaining 
12. Countries outside the euro 
area, however, might level 
the playing field by joining 
the banking union under 
the so-called Close Coop-
eration procedure.
13. The Governor of the Cen-
tral Bank of Ireland made 
a similar point in Lane 
(2016).
14. These include credit 
rating agencies and trade 
repositories. Note: one 
of the authors of this 
paper (Nicolas Véron) is 
an independent board 
member in a trade 
repository supervised by 
ESMA; see Bruegel website 
for details.
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15. MiFIR refers to the Markets 
in Financial Instruments 
Regulation (https://
ec.europa.eu/info/law/
markets-financial-in-
struments-mifir-regula-
tion-eu-no-600-2014_en). 
EMIR is the European 
Markets Infrastructure Reg-
ulation (https://ec.europa.
eu/info/business-econo-
my-euro/banking-and-fi-
nance/financial-markets/
post-trade-services_en).
16. We don’t discuss here the 
separate issue of the Eu-
ropean Banking Authority 
(EBA), currently based in 
London. Our recommen-
dation is that its future 
location be decided as 
soon as possible, in order 
to minimise operational 
disruption and loss of staff 
morale, and that its possi-
ble broader reform (also in 
the wake of banking union) 
be deferred to a later stage.
17. Schoenmaker and Véron 
(2016) found that European 
banking supervision of 
significant banks was 
generally “tough and fair”, 
based on euro area-wide 
observations and nine 
country-specific studies, 
as of mid-2016. Since then, 
developments especially 
in Portugal and Italy have 
further reinforced the 
assessment of effectiveness 
of the new supervisory 
mechanism.
18. COM/2015/0586 final; 
https://ec.europa.eu/
info/publications/com-
mission-proposal-eu-
ropean-deposit-insur-
ance-scheme-edis_en.
19. See Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker (2016) on 
the rising share of US 
investment banks in the 
European investment 
banking market.
through the general EU budget.
The reformed ESMA should be 
primarily focused on those market 
segments for which EU activity is 
currently most concentrated in London, 
such as the wholesale banking aspects 
of MiFID/MiFIR, eg the oversight of 
trading platforms, benchmarks, and 
all regulatory provisions applying to 
international financial infrastructures 
and derivatives (eg the European 
Markets Infrastructure Regulation, 
EMIR)¹⁵. For other aspects, such as 
initial public offering authorisations 
and fund management registrations, 
ESMA’s policy-setting role should be 
strengthened but national authorities 
could continue to take their own 
decisions for the foreseeable future. 
One other area that requires further 
convergence within the EU is accounting 
and auditing. ESMA should be the 
central authority for enforcement of 
International Financial Reporting 
Standards, even though accounting 
experts in national authorities would 
continue working on individual cases, 
and an EU-level supervisory framework 
should be created for audit networks (see 
also Véron and Wolff, 2015)¹⁶. 
STRENGTHENING BANKING UNION 
Thanks to the wide-ranging reforms 
agreed in 2012-14 and implemented 
since, the prudential supervision of banks 
is now significantly more integrated than 
other areas of financial regulation in the 
euro area, and this European banking 
supervision is working broadly as intend-
ed¹⁷. International investment banks that 
operate in London and want to set up a 
new entity or build up an existing entity 
in the euro area are already in talks with 
the ECB, which will ensure that they meet 
the substance requirement discussed in 
section 2. This will surely require the ECB 
to quickly learn and adapt, but overall 
there is no reason to doubt its ability to 
manage the corresponding authorisation 
and oversight processes. 
But banking union remains 
incomplete and its further development 
is needed to buttress the reshaping of 
the EU27’s financial markets post-Brexit. 
Specifically, the goal of strengthening 
banking union should include more 
explicit euro-area-wide risk-sharing 
arrangements, which could encompass 
the creation of a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (broadly along 
the lines proposed in November 2015 
by the European Commission)¹⁸, a 
mandate for the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to act as a backstop 
to the Single Resolution Fund and the 
future European Deposit Insurance 
Fund, and for the use of the ESM’s 
direct recapitalisation instrument for 
precautionary recapitalisation purposes. 
Simultaneously, there is a need for 
a properly calibrated framework for 
binding exposure limits on sovereign 
exposures of euro-area banks and for 
further harmonisation to come closer to 
the vision of a single rulebook required 
for banking supervision and for the 
insolvency regime that applies to euro-
area banks. 
Completing the banking union would 
also better enable European banking 
groups to challenge the currently 
dominant positions of leading US 
investment banks. The key factor here 
is the home base of European banking 
groups, which is still largely framed at 
a national rather than European scale¹⁹ 
and perpetuates significant distortions 
in euro-area countries (Schoenmaker, 
2016). 
Strengthening the banking union 
should also imply that not only the risks 
but also the benefits from an expanded 
euro area financial sector post-Brexit 
are better shared by euro area countries. 
Unless there is some sharing of benefits 
there is a danger that countries will be 
unwilling to share the risks, which would 
make the expanded financial sector of the 
euro area more vulnerable to financial 
instability.   
FINANCIAL SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE
With Brexit, some components of the 
EU27’s financial system infrastructure 
will find themselves outside of its terri-
torial scope. This challenge should force 
a broad rethink of the way the EU27 
manages its regulatory relationships 
with third countries, which for now are 
largely organised around the principle of 
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recognition of equivalence. This gener-
ates too much reliance on third-country 
authorities for critical infrastructure, such 
as clearing houses (also called central 
counterparties or CCPs in Europe), which 
are financial firms whose role in the 
financial system has been enhanced by 
recent derivatives market reforms and, in 
particular, by the requirement that many 
over-the-counter derivatives transactions 
should be centrally cleared by CCPs. Cur-
rently, EU-based CCPs are supervised by 
authorities in their home countries²⁰, and 
third-country (ie non-EU-based) CCPs 
are supervised by their home authorities 
on the basis of recognition by the Euro-
pean Commission of the equivalence of 
their supervisory regimes. By contrast, 
EU-based (or other) CCPs that operate 
in the United States are supervised not 
only by their home authorities, but also 
by the US authorities, including for their 
home-country operations (eg in London 
for UK-based international CCPs), under 
a robust surveillance framework that in-
cludes on-site (ie extraterritorial) inspec-
tions and data access. 
To ensure proper alignment between 
supervision and risk exposure, euro-area-
based CCPs should be supervised by 
European authorities under a framework 
akin to that in place for banking 
supervision, and a US-style third-country 
regime should be established by which 
these European authorities would also 
acquire extraterritorial supervisory 
capacity over non-EU-based (eg UK and 
US) CCPs that have systemic relevance 
for the EU27. Such arrangements 
would be in the interest of both the UK 
and the EU27, since they would avert 
the alternative option of a costly and 
economically sub-optimal ‘location 
policy’ that would restrict contingent 
ECB liquidity to only those CCPs that are 
based in the euro area.
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20. Recent legislative proposals 
from the European Com-
mission (http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-16-
3747_en.htm) extend this 
country-level framework to 
CCP resolution.
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